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1. Introduction  
In 1884, Robert Luedeking, Professor at the St. Louis Medical College and member of the St. 
Louis Board of Health, published a paper entitled The chief local factors in the causation of 
disease and death (Luedeking 1884), in which he wrote the following: 
[In St. Louis, in 1883, the population density of 9.8 persons to the acre] is indeed a low density 
compared with that of most metropolitan cities: that of London, for instance, is given at 52.5 to the 
acre in 1883. And yet we find the annual rate of mortality per thousand in London in 1883 to have 
been but 20.4, while that of St. Louis was 21.35. With such a variance existing in the relative 
densities, it must needs force itself upon our conviction that inherent faults in our sanitation must be 
the cause.  
In this paper Luedeking compares crude death rates between cities and finds that mortality 
in St. Louis is slightly higher than in London, even though population density is 
substantially lower in the former city. He then implicitly uses previous knowledge to 
attribute the unexpected similarity in mortality, given very different population densities, to 
deficient sanitation in St. Louis. This paragraph is illustrative of a process in which the 
application of causal inference to the improvement of population health is attempted: 
observing an unexpected difference (or a surprising similarity), identifying a cause based on 
observed data and expert knowledge, and recommending a public health action.  
This provides an interesting example of a pragmatic concept of cause in epidemiology. 
Today, health authorities would probably avoid such strong causal statements. However, it 
seems unfair to neglect that improving sanitation in St. Louis would very likely decrease 
mortality substantially at the time. 
A cause can be defined as a person or thing that acts, happens, or exists in such a way that 
some specific thing happens as a result; the producer of an effect (Dictionary.com 2011). On 
the one hand, this definition reflects the notion that causation is an essential component of 
the human understanding and interaction with the world. On the other hand, although this 
seems like a straightforward definition, which is probably in agreement with many if not 
most individuals’ concept of cause, it raises a number of questions: Does the cause always 
produce the effect? Are other causes involved in producing the effect? If the cause was 
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removed would the effect be produced? Formal discussions of these and other questions 
have been the focus of philosophical and scientific approaches to causation and the 
appropriate notion of cause for a certain discipline is influenced by the kind of causal 
knowledge that the discipline aims at producing. 
While theories on causation and causal inference have been abundantly discussed in the 
philosophical literature, an operational concept of causation is essential to conduct scientific 
research. In fact, science has developed experimentation as a useful approach to dealing 
with the complexity of causal inference. In etiologic epidemiology we are interested in 
understanding the mechanisms of disease causation and we aim at identifying targets for 
intervention in order to be ultimately able to reduce the burden and consequences of disease 
in the population.  
In epidemiologic research, however, the multifactorial etiology of human disease, the non-
modifiable nature of a number of health-related factors, and mainly the vastly unethical 
nature of experimentation in human subjects brought about the need to design and conduct 
studies that are knowingly imperfect approximations to the experimental ideal. In fact, in 
etiologic studies of human disease we are faced with a number of problems that threaten 
causal inference and whose avoidance and discussion are at the core of epidemiologic 
research. 
In practical terms, stating that causality is the best explanation for an observed association is 
equivalent to ruling out, with reasonable confidence, alternative explanations such as 
reverse causation, selection bias, information bias, confounding and chance. The 
formalization and discussion of these alternative explanations has become in fact so 
important in epidemiologic research that it was pointed out that these methodologic issues 
became the main focus of epidemiology textbooks, at the expense of little attention devoted 
to the discussion of such fundamental issues as theories of causation or hypothesis 
formulation (Krieger 1994). Indeed, there has been a shift in recent years towards framing 
the thinking and teaching of epidemiologic methods into a more solid theoretical basis for 
causal inference (Rothman et al 2008). 
Even though causal inference is such a central issue in epidemiology, and perhaps because 
of that, different views on causation have proliferated in the epidemiologic literature. A 
systematic review of scientific publications (Parascandola & Weed 2001) has identified 
several different explicit or implicit definitions of cause within the epidemiological 
literature, which the authors classified in the following categories: 
- production: causes are seen as part of the production of disease; 
- necessary causes: causes are conditions without which the effect cannot occur; 
- sufficient/component causes: one sufficient cause guarantees that the effect will occur, 
and each sufficient cause is made up of component causes, none of which is enough to 
produce the effect; 
- probabilistic causes: causes are seen as conditions which increase the probability of an 
effect, regardless of whether or not they are necessary or sufficient; 
- counterfactual causes: the presence of a cause, compared with its absence, makes a 
difference in the occurrence of the outcome, while all else is held constant. 
While no single model can aspire to provide the answer to causal questions in 
epidemiology, inferring causation from observed data in human populations is a complex 
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task which extends beyond the discussion of systematic or random errors, some of which 
may be dealt with through statistical methods. 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a brief overview of selected frameworks frequently 
used to assist causal inference in epidemiology. Although there are many interesting 
approaches to causation in the epidemiologic literature, the ones referred below were 
chosen for historical significance or because of their increasing relevance in epidemiologic 
research. An additional interesting aspect of the approaches chosen is that they originate 
from different areas of knowledge, from philosophy (the sufficient and component causes 
model and the counterfactual model) to medicine/biology (Hill’s considerations) and 
computer science (causal diagrams). 
2. Frameworks for causal inference 
2.1 Bradford Hill’s considerations regarding causation  
During the first half of the 20th century it became increasingly clear that monocausal theories 
of human disease were virtually useless to explain chronic conditions (Broadbent 2009). 
Models that were previously applied to explain the distribution of disease proved useful, to 
a large extent, to prevent or treat communicable conditions. However, they were clearly 
insufficient to uncover the multifactorial etiology of complex chronic diseases and therefore 
inadequate to identify targets for chronic disease prevention. The increasing interest in 
understanding the etiology of non-communicable diseases brought about the challenge of 
re-thinking the process of causal inference from observed data. 
In 1965, in his famous paper entitled The environment and disease: association or causation?, Sir 
Austin Bradford Hill recognized the fundamental problem of deriving a causal 
interpretation from observed associations between exposure and disease (Hill 1965). In this 
widely known paper, his aim was to provide guidance regarding the process that goes from 
finding an association between an exposure and a disease to deciding that causation is the 
most likely explanation for that association. His approach clearly intends a detachment from 
the philosophical discussion of causation. Rather than proposing a theoretical model for 
causal inference, he puts forward a set of empirical aspects of associations that should be 
examined to guide the judgment of causality, namely: 
a. Strength: this consideration is based on the premise that the stronger an association is the 
less likely it is that there is some alternative unknown explanation rather than causation; 
b. Consistency: this refers to the replication of the findings in different methodological, 
geographical and time settings; 
c. Specificity: this refers to the high probability that an exposure is causally linked to 
some outcomes more than to others; 
d. Temporality: this means that the putative cause must precede the effect and is probably 
the only indisputable criterion for causality; 
e. Biologic gradient: this refers to the existence of a dose-response relation by which 
increased dose of exposure is related with increased expression of the outcome; 
f. Plausibility: this refers to the agreement of the examined association with existing 
biological knowledge; 
g. Coherence: this argues for the importance that the association is not conflicting with 
scientific knowledge on the disease; 
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h. Experiment: this refers to the possibility of eliciting the outcome by experimentally 
introducing exposure or, in human populations, an alternative such as the possibility of 
preventing the outcome by removing the exposure; 
i. Analogy: this refers to the existence of similar outcomes with exposures of the same 
kind. 
It is noteworthy that the ranking of these considerations was intentional. As acknowledged 
by Hill, none of these items is necessary for deciding that an association translates a causal 
relation (except for temporality), and the whole set is not sufficient to prove causation. 
Therefore, the author himself clearly states that this should not be used as a checklist for 
causal inference, though it has thereafter frequently served that purpose. Such widespread 
misuse has probably exposed the limitations of this set of considerations and they have 
often been dismissed as having little utility in causality assessment. However, it should be 
noted that one of the major contributions of Hill’s paper is probably not only the list of 
viewpoints but also his reflection that, in the presence of an association, the fundamental 
question that the practice of epidemiology attempts at answering is: “is there any other of 
explaining the set of facts before us, is there any other answer equally, or more, likely than 
cause and effect?”. In fact, the key notion is that, if a more likely explanation for the 
observed association exists, it will probably emerge from the analysis of one or more of 
Hill’s considerations. Another important contribution of this paper is the clear statement 
that significance testing is useful to quantify the magnitude of the role of chance but adds 
nothing to the purpose of deciding whether or not an association is causal. 
Aiming at analyzing the role of the infection with the human papilloma virus as a potential 
necessary cause for cervical cancer, Bosch et al underwent the massive process of reviewing 
available evidence and formally assessing the concordance of observed data with the 
considerations published by Hill, as well as those subsequently adopted by the International 
Agency for Research on Cancer (Bosch et al 2002). In this extensive review, by combining 
those considerations with the sufficient and component causes model, the authors conclude 
that the role of the infection is consistent with that of a necessary cause for cancer. Although 
compelling evidence of a causal relation had been available for a long time, their work takes 
a formal approach to ruling out alternative explanations and is additionally relevant in 
showing the role of Hill’s important considerations in current causal inference. 
2.2 Sufficient and component causes model  
Aiming at bringing together a philosophical view of cause and the practice of epidemiology, 
Kenneth Rothman proposed an application of a sufficient and component causes model to 
epidemiology (Rothman 1976). Central to this model are the notions that each person is 
susceptible to multiple diseases and that each disease is a multifactorial outcome that results 
from the co-occurrence of several factors. The minimum set of causes enough to elicit 
disease is called a sufficient cause. Since it is reasonable to assume that not all individuals 
develop the disease through the same causal process, different sufficient causes are possible 
for the same disease, each with a different combination of factors (Figure 1, sufficient causes 
I to IV). Each of the factors that build up one or more of the sufficient causes is called a 
component cause (Fig. 1, CC1 to CC7). One of the interesting features of this model is that it 
enables the representation of sets of component causes that are assumed to intervene in 
disease causation but have not yet been identified (component causes U in Figure 1).  
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CC1 CC2
UCC3
CC1 CC4
UCC5
CC1 CC4
UCC6
CC1 CC7
UU
Sufficient cause I Sufficient cause II
Sufficient cause III Sufficient cause IV
 
Fig. 1. Hypothetical examples of four sufficient causes for a disease. CC1 to CC7 – known 
component causes; U – unknown component cause(s) 
In order to have a causal interpretation, component causes must be defined relative to a 
clearly defined contrast, i.e. a reference state with which the index state is compared. Since 
the underlying reality from which causes emerge may have various patent or latent 
dimensions, each of which may be seen as a continuum, component causes should be 
defined in relation to a number of attributes. These attributes are essential to conceptualize 
the presence of each component cause relative to the above-mentioned reference state. To 
clarify this, we may consider an example where we are studying the occurrence of an event 
such as venous thromboembolism in women as a possible adverse reaction to the use of a 
particular, clearly identified hormonal preparation. To define the use of that specific 
medication as a component cause, we should specify attributes such as dose (What mass of 
drug per day does the component cause refer to? Is the dose defined in relation to body 
size? Is the cumulative amount of life exposure a relevant attribute?), duration (How much 
exposure time should be considered in the index state? How is intermittent use of the drug 
relevant to the cause? Is there a particularly decisive biological timing of exposure, such as a 
specified gynecological age?), induction period (Which is the relevant time interval between 
the occurrence of the first component cause in the specific sufficient cause(s) of 
thromboembolism in which the hormone preparation is included and the completion of that 
sufficient cause?), and reversibility (Is it reasonable to assume a transient effect of hormone 
preparations on thromboembolism? Can the elimination of that exposure be considered 
complete, i.e. is a woman who never used the preparation in the same circumstances relative 
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to the presence of the component cause as a woman who has never used it?). Although these 
examples of attributes are by no means exhaustive, they illustrate a part of the complexity in 
the decision of what constitutes a component cause. At the same time they elucidate on the 
need for its definition as clearly as possible when discussing causation. 
Additionally, component causes may be necessary for the occurrence of disease if they are 
present in every possible sufficient cause (such as CC1). Disease occurs in an individual 
when one of the sufficient causes is completed, i.e. all its component causes are present. The 
period throughout which component causes accumulate to finally produce clinical disease is 
called the latent period.  
It should be noted that different component and therefore sufficient causes have different 
frequencies in the population. The notion of risk at the individual level can therefore be 
translated into whether or not a sufficient cause is completed. At the group level risk 
becomes the proportion of people in whom a sufficient cause is completed. An implication 
of this reasoning to observed data is that the strength of association of a component cause 
with the occurrence of disease is directly dependent on the frequency of the other causes 
with which it shares a sufficient cause.  
It also results from this model that if one component cause may be identified and prevented, 
all cases of disease that result from the sufficient cause or causes in which that component 
cause is present will be avoided. This is in accordance with the intuitive notion that 
identifying and subsequently eliminating a necessary cause will eradicate disease since it 
will impair the completion of all sufficient causes. In terms of measures of impact, this 
model implies that the etiologic fraction of a component cause is the proportion of disease 
that is attributable to the sufficient causes that contain that component. 
This model provides a clear conceptual meaning for effect modification or biological 
interaction: two component causes can be said to interact synergistically simply if there is 
one sufficient cause that contains both of them. There is full synergism if they are only 
involved in producing the disease through the sufficient cause in which they are both 
present, i.e., there is no other sufficient cause in which one of them is present rather than the 
one in which they interact (complete synergism between CC2 and CC3 but partial synergism 
between CC4 and CC5). One of the interesting features of this model is that it clearly 
distinguishes the concept of interaction – a biological concept which can be represented 
under this framework – from the concept of confounding – a phenomenon which is 
introduced by the observer and has no biological role in disease causation. 
Although the sufficient and component causes model has been used mainly as a conceptual 
framework for causal thinking, namely for teaching purposes, an interesting application to 
data from the European Prospective Investigation into Cancer and Nutrition has been 
published (Hoffmann et al 2006). The authors identified all possible combinations in a set of 
known component causes of myocardial infarction (smoking, hypertension, obesity and lack 
of exercise). Every possible combination was considered to be part of a set of sufficient 
causes and the population attributable fraction regarding that combination of factors was 
taken as a measure of the proportion of disease attributable to that class of sufficient causes 
in the population. The authors argue that beyond its theoretical contribution, by allowing 
for the modeling of sufficient causes without necessarily knowing all of the component 
causes, the model may be used to guide public health interventions. 
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2.3 Counterfactual model  
According to counterfactual theories in philosophy, causation may be reflected upon by 
hypothesizing what would have occurred had the conditions been different from the actual 
conditions observed. In terms of counterfactual conditionals, the meaning of a cause A can 
be defined in the form “If A had not occurred, C would not have occurred” (Menzies 2009). 
Although it had been long explored in the philosophical literature, the application of the 
counterfactual model, or potential outcomes model, to epidemiologic research is recent 
(Greenland & Robins 1986). 
According to the counterfactual approach, when assessing whether an exposure causes an 
outcome, most of the time we are interested, even if not explicitly stated, in comparing the 
occurrence of the outcome when the exposure is present with its occurrence if the exposure 
was absent and all other factors remained equal (Maldonado & Greenland 2002). If we could 
compare these outcomes and they were different, we would conclude that there was a 
causal relation between the exposure and the outcome. In other words, the counterfactual 
ideal contrasts the occurrence of the outcome in the actual exposure status (the observed, 
factual outcome) with the occurrence of outcome in the same individual or population had 
the exposure not been present (the unobserved, counterfactual outcome).The counterfactual 
or potential outcomes model formalizes this contrast in terms of epidemiologic research. 
At the individual level, subjects may be classified according to four susceptibility types 
under the model, defined according to the combination of both potential outcomes (factual 
and counterfactual). Even though we can only observe factual outcomes, each individual 
can theoretically be classified according to two responses: the occurrence of the outcome had 
he been exposed and the occurrence of the outcome had he not been exposed. Table 1 shows 
the occurrence of the outcome according to each susceptibility type. If we consider an 
adverse outcome, susceptibility type 1 designates individuals who will develop the outcome 
whether or not they are exposed – they are doomed. Type 2 groups individuals who will 
develop the outcome if they are exposed but not if they are unexposed - causative exposure; 
among these, the exposure has a causal effect on the outcome. Individuals in whom the 
outcome will occur if the exposure is absent but not if the exposure is present are grouped in 
type 3 - preventive exposure. Finally, subjects are called immune (type 4) if they will not 
develop the outcome during the observation period whether or not they are exposed. It 
should then be noted that in types 1 and 4 factual and counterfactual outcomes are the same, 
i.e., the exposure has no effect on the occurrence of the outcome. The presence of the 
exposure relative to its absence affects only types 2 and 3. 
Counterfactual susceptibility 
type 
Occurrence of outcome if 
exposed 
Occurrence of outcome if 
not exposed 
Type 1 – doomed 1 1 
Type 2 – exposure causal 1 0 
Type 3 – exposure preventive 0 1 
Type 4 – immune 0 0 
Table 1. Counterfactual susceptibility types classified according to the occurrence of 
outcome in factual/counterfactual exposure conditions. Legend – 1: present, 0: absent 
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Although we can admit the theoretical existence of a counterfactual contrast, for each 
individual we can observe only one outcome while the other remains, by definition, 
unobserved. Therefore, we cannot classify an individual into his susceptibility type. Since 
potential outcomes include a response that would have been observed in an exposure 
experience that did not actually take place, if individual A is exposed and the outcome 
occurs we can classify him as type 1 or 2 but we will not be able to distinguish between 
these two types. Therefore, we will not be able to differentiate between an individual who 
would have developed the outcome whether or not he had been exposed and one who 
developed the outcome because of the exposure. This non-identifiability issue arises from 
the fact that the same observed association (occurrence of the outcome given exposure) may 
originate from both causal (type 2) and noncausal (type 1) relations. In the same way, if the 
outcome is not observed among an exposed individual B, that information does not allow 
for the distinction between an individual in whom the exposure was preventive and one 
who was immune to the outcome (types 3 and 4, respectively). 
Greenland & Robins add that the observation that an exposed individual develops the 
outcome while an unexposed does not develop the outcome has no causal interpretation 
unless the assumption that these two individuals belong to the same susceptibility type is 
added to the observed data. This assumption implies that individuals are exchangeable, i.e. 
that if individual A had been unexposed and individual B had been exposed the same 
overall result would have been observed. Confounding becomes then equivalent to a lack of 
exchangeability and therefore may be defined in terms of comparability. Because 
counterfactual parameters are by definition unobservable, the exchangeability assumption is 
not verifiable. In practical terms this means that the comparability between exposed and 
unexposed subjects (i.e. the magnitude of confounding) cannot be measured directly from 
observed data. 
Although this model is applicable to the individual, the unobserved nature of 
counterfactuals impairs causal inference at the individual level. Therefore, in epidemiology, 
we are frequently interested in estimating average effects in a population of an exposure in 
the occurrence of a disease. In a population, the counterfactual reasoning translates into 
comparing the probability of the occurrence of the outcome if the entire population had one 
exposure distribution (Figure 2, A1) with the probability of occurrence if the entire 
population had an alternative exposure distribution (A0). A causal effect would be present if 
these counterfactual probabilities were different (Maldonado & Greenland 2002).  
It should be emphasized that under the counterfactual approach, an effect measure 
compares the frequency of the outcome under two exposure distributions, but in one target 
population during one etiologic time period. Since the true causal effect is by its 
counterfactual definition never observable (because the two exposure distributions cannot 
occur simultaneously in the same target population), causal inference has to rely on the 
contrast between the actual frequency of the outcome in the observed target population (A1) 
and the actual frequency of the outcome in a population which is a substitute for the 
counterfactual disease frequency in the target population with regard to the exposure under 
study (B0). The more similar the substitute is to the target population the more likely it is 
that the true causal contrast (riskA1/riskA0) is reflected in the estimated contrast 
(riskA1/riskB0). Bias in etiologic studies may be seen as resulting from the existence of 
relevant differences between the substitute and the target. 
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Target population
A1. Target population with
actual exposure distribution 1 
(observable)
A0. Target population with
counterfactual exposure distribution 0 
(unobservable)
True causal contrast of interest
(originatescausal risk ratio)
Estimated causal contrast using
substitute for the target population
(originates association risk ratio)
A1. Target population with
actual exposure distribution 1 
(observable)
B0. Substitute population with
actual exposure distribution 0 
(observable)
 
Fig. 2. Ideal causal (counterfactual) contrast and estimated causal contrast.  
In the counterfactual framework, randomization can be seen as a means of obtaining the 
observed contrast as close as possible to the counterfactual ideal. If we assume perfect 
randomization and no random error, both groups (exposed to the index intervention and 
unexposed) are as similar as possible with regard to measured and unmeasured factors. As 
a consequence, the probability of developing the outcome among the control group equals 
the probability of developing the outcome in the intervention group had the latter not 
received the intervention (counterfactual). In this circumstance, groups are considered 
exchangeable and the causal risk ratio is accurately estimated by the associational risk ratio. 
An application of the counterfactual framework to discuss selection criteria and 
generalizability of safety conclusions in randomized controlled trials has been recently 
published (Weisberg et al 2009). For a number of reasons, in trials of pharmacological 
interventions it is usual to exclude individuals with increased probability of drop-out or 
adverse events. This option is chosen at the expense of generalizability regarding the safety 
of the intervention, since selection probability is dependent on the baseline risk of adverse 
event. In their work, Weisberg et al argue that trials usually screen out individuals at high 
risk of an adverse event by measuring indicators of such risk. They make the point that 
those indicators are also predictive of the probability of experiencing adverse events in the 
absence of treatment (i.e. under placebo) since they are measured before the intervention 
starts. The authors assume that these indicators remain better predictors of the probability of 
adverse event under placebo than if treatment is introduced. As a result of those strict 
selection criteria, individuals most likely to have an adverse event if placed in the placebo 
arm of the trial have higher probability of being excluded. In counterfactual terms, this 
orig nates associational  r ti  
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means that there is an underrepresentation of individuals for whom the intervention would 
be preventive, i.e. who would have the adverse event if under placebo but not if they 
received the active treatment.  
Table 2 presents the hypothetical results proposed by the authors for a trial where the 
outcome is an adverse event. Two scenarios are posed: one in which all counterfactual 
susceptibility types regarding the adverse event under study have the same selection 
probability, which corresponds to their prevalence in the target population, and another in 
which there is selective undersampling of individuals who would have had the event under 
placebo, i.e. doomed and preventive susceptibility types. In this example, the authors use 
counterfactual susceptibility types to illustrate that the ratio of the risks of adverse event 
between the two arms may be biased and a conclusion of a causal effect may be derived 
when the observed association is due only to selection criteria which originate a dependence 
between counterfactual susceptibility types and the probability of entering the trial.  
Under non-differential selection criteria 
Counterfactual 
susceptibility 
type 
Proportion 
in the 
population 
Selection 
probability 
Number of 
participants 
in each arm 
Adverse 
events under 
active 
treatment 
Adverse 
events 
under 
placebo 
Doomed 6% 100% 15 15 15 
Causal 4% 100% 10 10 0 
Preventive 4% 100% 10 0 10 
Immune 86% 100% 215 0 0 
Risk of adverse event 10.0% 10.0% 
Under differential selection criteria 
Counterfactual 
susceptibility 
type 
Proportion 
in the 
population 
Selection 
probability 
Number of 
participants 
in each arm 
Adverse 
events under 
active 
treatment 
Adverse 
events 
under 
placebo 
Doomed 6% 20% 3 3 3 
Causal 4% 80% 8 8 0 
Preventive 4% 20% 2 0 2 
Immune 86% 80% 172 0 0 
Risk of adverse event 5.9% 2.7% 
Table 2. Selection probability for a hypothetical randomized trial according to counterfactual 
susceptibility types (adapted from Weisberg 2009). 
This is an interesting example of the use of counterfactual thinking for illustrating selection 
bias. Although one may assume, contrarily to the authors, that individuals who are at 
greater risk of developing adverse events under treatment (doomed and causal rather that 
doomed and preventive) are underrepresented, the issue of different selection probabilities 
given different susceptibility types would remain relevant. 
More often than not, experimental studies are not feasible and causal inference relies on 
observational data. In non-randomized studies, confounding emerges if the chosen 
substitute does not accurately represent the target population under the counterfactual 
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condition, i.e. if the two groups of contrasting exposure distributions that are compared 
with respect to the occurrence of the outcome are not exchangeable. Such inadequate 
substitute may originate relevant differences between the observed (associational) risk ratio 
and the true (causal) risk ratio. 
Today, there is growing use of the counterfactual model of causation in epidemiologic 
research. The application of the counterfactual framework to epidemiologic research has 
been subject to discussion (Dawid 2002; Elwert & Winship 2002; Kaufman & Kaufman 2002; 
Shafer 2002). In practice, it should be noted that this framework does not aim at clarifying 
mechanisms of disease causation and that there is a potential for impossible counterfactuals, 
which are not amenable to intervention and have therefore limited interest in public health. 
Nevertheless, the model provides, for individuals or populations, a causal interpretation to 
measures of association. More importantly, the counterfactual ideal is relevant in the design 
and analysis of etiologic studies since it provides a framework for choosing the target 
population as well as an appropriate substitute for that target. It is also an important 
approach to clarify threats to validity. 
2.4 Causal diagrams 
One of the most intuitive ways of representing and communicating hypothetical causal 
relations between epidemiological variables is to visually depict the paths believed to relate 
them, namely exposure, outcome and possible confounders. For a long time the use of such 
visual tools to assist causal inference was informal and lacked theoretical support. The 
development of computer science and the corresponding need for improvement of the 
quality of the decision process on the basis of the relations between previously defined and 
empirical data from complex systems led to the development of a solid theoretical basis for 
the use of graphical models (Pearl 1995). 
This body of work allowed for the formal application of causal diagrams outside the 
artificial intelligence domain to a number of areas where causal inference relies on the 
combination of causal assumptions with observational data. Causal diagrams have been 
increasingly used in epidemiology and have proved to be a helpful approach to 
conceptualize research questions and analytical issues (Greenland et al 1999). Indeed, one of 
the most interesting features of these diagrams is that, by depicting qualitative and 
nonparametric assumptions of causal mechanisms linking variables in a dataset and 
knowing a number of mathematical rules, it is possible to characterize the nature of 
common systematic errors in causal inference, as well as to guide study design. 
Causal diagrams used in epidemiology are known as directed acyclic graphs (DAGs). The 
relations between variables in a DAG are translated in a set of formal rules known as d-
separation rules (where d means “directional”), which are used to judge whether variables 
are associated (d-connected) or independent (d-separated) (Pearl 2009). In a DAG, variables 
are named nodes and are linked by arrows called edges. Since a variable cannot be, at the 
same instant, a cause and a consequence of another variable there are no cycles in DAGs. In 
the following example, E and O are nodes connected by an edge. In DAG terminology E is a 
parent or ancestor of O, and O is a child or descendant of E. 
EO 
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A path is a sequence of edges that connect two variables regardless of the direction of the 
edges, such as the following path that links variables A and O. This path is called 
unblocked because there are no head to head arrows colliding along the path: 
AXEO 
If two edges meet head to head the node where they meet is called a collider. In the 
following example, where Y is a collider, the path between A and Y is unblocked (A and Y 
are d-connected) but the path between A and O is blocked by Y (A and O are d-separated): 
AXEYO 
Any one of these nodes (or variables) may be conditioned on or, in other words, it may be 
set at a specific value. In classic epidemiologic language, this is most of the times equivalent 
to adjustment for or stratification according to X. If a non-collider such as X is conditioned 
on, as shown by the square symbol around it, the path between A and Y becomes blocked 
and A and Y become d-separated: 
AXEYO 
If, however, a collider such as Y is conditioned on, the path between A and O becomes 
unblocked and A and O become d-connected: 
AXEYO 
Pearl provided also a very clear example of the meaning of conditioning on a collider. 
Suppose that there are two reasons for a car not starting: not having fuel and having a dead 
battery, according to the following diagram: 
Dead battery  Car does not start  No fuel 
These causes are marginally independent, i.e., having information on one of them tells us 
nothing about the other (they are d-separated). Indeed, knowing that the battery is dead 
does not improve our prediction of whether or not there is fuel. However, if the collider is 
conditioned on, i.e., if we known that the car does not start, knowing that the battery is not 
dead tells us that there must be no fuel. Dead battery and no fuel, which were marginally 
independent, become dependent (d-connected) by conditioning on their common effect. If 
the descendant of a collider such as Z is conditioned on, the path between A and O also 
becomes unblocked: 
                      AXEYO 
                                                                                      
             Z 
A DAG is causal only if it includes the common causes of any two nodes represented 
(Markov condition). In the previous case, if there is a variable X which is a common cause of 
E and O it must be depicted in the diagram. This condition simplifies the diagram since it 
implies that any variable which is not a common cause of two or more variables in the DAG 
does not need to be depicted in the graph. 
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X  E  O  
 
In the previous diagram the path that connects E to O through X (EXO) is called a 
backdoor path. If the common cause of E and O is conditioned on, that backdoor path will 
be closed. Consequently, if X is the only common cause of E and O, after adjustment for X, 
the statistical association found between E and O will be a result of the true causal effect of E 
on O, which is equivalent to eliminating confounding. 
Using the above-mentioned rules, and assuming no random error, statistical associations 
between variables can be found in the three following causal diagram scenarios: 
1. They are cause (E) and effect (O): 
EO 
2. They share common causes (X) that have not been conditioned on (open backdoor 
path): 
X  E  O 
  
3. They share common effects (Y) that have been conditioned on: 
EYO 
While the first alternative depicts a true causal effect of E on O, the second scenario is the 
graphical representation of confounding and the third translates selection bias.  
A very interesting example of the application of causal diagrams to judge the 
appropriateness of conditioning on available variables has been presented to explain the so-
called “birth weight paradox” (Hernandez-Diaz et al 2006). In perinatal epidemiology, birth 
weight is a routinely collected variable because of its ability to predict adverse outcomes 
during infancy. Probably as a result of its importance and wide availability, birth weight is 
frequently an adjustment or stratification variable in the analysis of the effects of several 
other exposures on infant mortality.  
From the comparison of the associations found among low birth weight infants with those 
found in normal weight infants emerged what was called the birth weight paradox: the 
associations between known adverse exposures such as maternal smoking and infant 
mortality was weaker among low birth weight infants than among normal weight children. 
In other words, although it was known that smoking caused low birth weight and increased 
infant mortality, it was estimated that the effect of smoking on mortality was greater in 
normal weight infants. As a consequence, it was hypothesized that maternal smoking could 
be protective against infant mortality in low birth weight children. 
To explain this apparent paradox, Hernandez-Diaz et al proposed several DAGs depicting a 
priori assumptions about the causal relations between variables. They proposed that even 
using a simple set of causal assumptions it may be shown that bias may arise from 
adjustment to birth weight. Convincing evidence exists that there are common causes of low 
birth weight and mortality (U), such as birth defects and malnutrition. In those 
circumstances, the most simplistic DAG that could be drawn would be the following: 
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Maternal smokingLow birth weight  Infant mortality  
 
U 
Low birth weight is a collider in this graph, since it is a common effect of smoking as well as 
of other causes (U). Conditioning on birth weight will create a spurious dependence 
between maternal smoking and the other low birth causes. Indeed, if we know that a child 
had low birth weight and that the mother never smoked, then it is more likely that the child 
had low birth weight because of another (probably more serious) cause than maternal 
smoking, such as a birth defect. That other cause will probably be a stronger determinant of 
infant mortality than smoking.  
Therefore, in low birth weight infants, smoking may appear protective of infant mortality 
only because, after birth weight stratification, it indicates lower probability of other causes 
of low birth weight and therefore of infant mortality. This bias will emerge even if the “true” 
causal DAG includes an effect of low birth weight on infant mortality and/or an effect of 
maternal smoking on mortality not mediated by birth weight, as shown in the following 
diagram: 
 
Maternal smokingLow birth weightInfant mortality  
 
U 
This interesting example of the introduction of selection bias in the analysis of data 
illustrates the usefulness of causal diagrams in distinguishing between variables that 
measure common causes and those which measure common effects. In fact, one of the points 
made by the authors of the example referred above is that the choice of variables to include 
in regression modeling should not be driven by their availability or biological relevance 
alone, but after a hypothesis has been formulated on what their role in the causal pathway 
might be.  
Another important example of a decision in data analysis where causal diagrams may be of 
importance is the analysis of change, which is of great importance with the increasing 
abundance of prospectively collected data. Imagine we are studying the physiological 
increase in bone strength (measured through bone mineral density) throughout adolescence. 
We are interested in assessing whether adiposity in early adolescence (measured as body fat 
mass) has an effect on the extent of bone strength increase between early and late 
adolescence. Suppose that we have a dataset with the following variables: 
- Bone mineral density in early adolescence (BMDearly) 
- Bone mineral density increase from early to late adolescence (BMDchange) 
- Total body fat mass in early adolescence (Fatearly) 
There is a body of evidence indicating that total body fat has an overall positive effect on 
bone strength at the same age. Additionally, there is also evidence that baseline bone 
density has an effect on the change in bone strength throughout the following years. Our 
causal DAG could be the following: 
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FatearlyBMDearly BMDchange 
What we want to know is if there might be an effect of fat on BMD change that is 
independent of bone mineral density in early adolescence, as depicted in the following 
diagram: 
FatearlyBMDearly BMDchange 
   
One of the questions we frequently have when facing this kind of research problems is 
whether or not we should adjust for baseline characteristics, in this case for BMD in early 
adolescence. Using different examples, the point has been made that it is very likely that 
there are unmeasured common causes of variables shown in the previous diagram 
(Glymour et al 2005; VanderWeele 2009). According to rules previously presented, any 
common causes of two variables in a DAG have to be depicted. That means that the 
previous DAG is probably not a good representation of the true causal structure, and that 
the following diagram could be more consistent with previous expert knowledge: 
  
FatearlyBMDearly BMDchange  
 
U 
This addition of unmeasured common causes to the diagram turns BMDearly into a collider, 
which means that adjusting for (or conditioning on) that variable creates a spurious 
association between those common causes and adiposity, which were marginally 
independent before adjustment. This means that an adjusted estimate may be biased, since 
we may be in truth measuring the association between those unmeasured common causes 
and bone strength change and estimating it as the true effect of adiposity on bone strength 
change.  
If we consider that one of those unmeasured common causes may be lean body mass, we 
may see conditioning on a collider similarly to the car example: if an adolescent has low 
body fat and high bone strength, that may be due to increase lean mass, which has 
documented positive effect on bone properties. Adjusting for baseline BMD (a collider) 
could therefore originate biased effect estimates. Only by identifying and measuring all 
common causes of any two variables in the diagram would we be able to adjust for them, 
blocking all backdoor paths and thus eliminating confounding. 
As seen from the examples above, by applying a small set of formal mathematical rules 
these diagrams provide a tool for identifying sources of bias in study design or in the 
analysis of results, thus providing an interesting framework for causal inference. DAGs 
have the additional advantage of clearly depicting assumptions about the causal structure of 
data, thus improving clarity in the communication of hypothesized causal relations between 
variables. Since they are nonparametric qualitative models which do not by themselves 
provide information on the magnitude of effects, DAGs may be used to assess to which 
extent previous assumptions are compatible with observed data.  
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Causal diagrams should not be expected to provide the answer to causal questions. DAGs 
are useful exactly because we will most probably never know the “true” DAG for most 
causal mechanisms. These diagrams provide a common framework for clarifying causal 
assumptions and guiding study design and data analysis in such a way that it is not 
contradictory with those assumptions. 
3. Conclusion 
Epidemiologic research is primarily driven by the observation of difference, which in 
human populations virtually never corresponds to an ideal contrast. Epidemiologists then 
try to explain that difference and to identify the factors that can be acted upon to improve 
population health. 
The development and widespread use of statistical modeling techniques has dramatically 
improved our ability to efficiently quantify statistical associations between variables. It has 
allowed us to model relations between enormous numbers of variables. In the context of 
etiologic research, the magnitude and even the statistical significance of the associations 
estimated have been used as evidence for causation, while a more formal causality 
assessment has frequently gone undiscussed.  
In order to quantify the role of different types of findings in the appraisal of causality, an 
interesting experience conducted among 159 epidemiologists, where each subject was 
shown computer-simulated summaries of evidence of the relation between an exposure and 
an outcome (Holman et al 2001). In this study, the factors with the strongest influence in 
causal attribution by epidemiologists were statistical significance and refutation of 
alternative explanations, followed by strength of association and coherence. 
The frameworks presented strengthen the point that etiologic research aims at disclosing 
causal relations rather than co-occurring characteristics. Assumptions regarding causation 
are present in virtually all domains of scientific research. In areas where controlled 
experiments are admissible, the observation of difference may frequently be taken as 
evidence for causation and the theory underlying causal thinking remains implicit. 
However, causal inference in epidemiology can seldom be a result of such ideal 
experiments. The observational nature of most epidemiologic research is probably the main 
reason for the search for frameworks to guide causal inference in the study of the etiology of 
human disease.  
None of the models presented can be expected to uncover the complexity of disease 
causation. Nevertheless, these frameworks are important contributions for the design and 
analysis of epidemiological studies, as well as for integrating observed data and prior 
knowledge with the purpose of judging whether or not a true causal effect is the best 
explanation for differences observed. 
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